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Abstract
I investigate the widely held view that fundamental musical ontology should be
descriptivist rather than revisionary, that is, that it should describe how we think about
musical works, rather than how they are independently of our thought about them. I argue
that if we take descriptivism seriously then, first, we should be sceptical of artontological arguments that appeal to independent metaphysical respectability and,
second, we should give ‘fictionalism’ about musical works – the theory that they do not
exist – more serious consideration than it is usually accorded.
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…when you encounter certain things in the world, the evidence for certain things,
you realize that you have come upon somethin that you may very well not be
equal to and I think that this is one of them things. When you’ve said that it’s real
and not just in your head I’m not all that sure what it is you have said. 1

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MUSICAL ONTOLOGY

It is not uncommon to view debate over the ontology of music, at least in the world of
analytic philosophy, as having been kick-started by the publication of Nelson Goodman’s
Languages of Art in 1968. 2 The ontology of music Goodman proposed is notable in at
least two respects: (1) it is nominalist, identifying works with sets of concreta,
specifically scores and performances, and (2) it is revisionary, in the sense that Goodman
placed such a high premium on achieving what he considered to be the right kind of
philosophical theory that he was explicitly prepared to revise beliefs quite central to
musical practice – such as that a performance of a work might contain a wrong note – in
order to preserve what he saw as the features of a good philosophical theory.
In response to Goodman, most musical ontologists have attempted to provide a
less revisionary account of what a musical work is, and of the relationship between a
work and a performance of it. Part of how this has been attempted, resulting in a major
strand in the history of musical ontology, is through the rejection of Goodman’s
nominalism in favour of some other kind of metaphysical theory. This is one way to
account for the diversity of ontological theories that have been defended since Goodman.
Most notably, there have been two varieties of action theorists and several varieties of
realists, falling into two main camps: the Platonists and ‘creationists’. 3 (Though there
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have also been eliminativists and idealists about musical works, these theories have been
more discussed than defended since Goodman.) Most recently the wheel has come full
circle, and there has been a resurgence of interest in nominalism. 4 On good days, all these
theories seem to me to be the ‘embarrassment of riches’ Amie Thomasson has
characterized them as, 5 though on bad days they seem like burnt-out wrecks drifting on
the ontological sea.
I tend to see the early theorists in this area, most notably Goodman, Richard
Wollheim, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, as approaching the ontology of art as just one more
instance of the problem of universals. Musical works, they note, appear to be ‘generic’
entities – entities that admit of multiple instances. What kinds of things, then, could they
be? The familiar answers are pretty clearly reflected in the list I have just gone through:
they could be collections of concrete objects (nominalism), or abstracta that exist more or
less independently (Platonism or creationism), or maybe they don’t really exist at all
(eliminativism), or only in our heads (idealism). Thinking about musical works in these
terms gives rise to some familiar problems. For instance, if you think of a work as a kind
of universal instantiated in performances, then it can seem quite a problem to explain
how it is that a performance might instantiate that universal without containing all the
notes that are definitive of the work.
There is a parallel history of musical ontology since Goodman, however, wherein
one can discern a growing awareness that one might reject Goodman’s revisionism
independently of his nominalism. That is, there has been a growing interest in, or unrest
about, the proper methodology for doing the ontology of music and the other arts. This
strand of theorizing grew out of an interest in the nature of performance, and musical
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practice more generally. 6 One of the main ideas that arose out of this work was that there
must be some sort of intentional relation between a performance and the work it is of.
This seems a promising route for a solution to the ‘wrong-note problem’ since we might
hope to find success conditions on having an intention such as to play Bach’s first solo
sonata for violin that are less demanding than the identity conditions of that piece. That
is, you might perform a piece by seriously, or reasonably, intending to play it, and yet fail
to get all the notes right.7 One reason this is an interesting development is that it doesn’t
appeal, at least on its face, to any particular position in what I have come to call the
‘fundamentalist debate’, that is, the debate about which fundamental ontological category
musical works belong to, and yet it solves one of the problems that the participants in that
debate are interested in.
A nice case-study for this ‘dual history’ of musical ontology is Jerrold Levinson’s
seminal essay from 1980, ‘What a Musical Work Is’. 8 In that essay, Levinson imposes
three desiderata on any ontology of (a central class of) classical musical works: such
works must be (i) creatable, (ii) individuated finely, by their musico-historical contexts,
and (iii) include their instrumentation essentially. Levinson goes on to deduce that
musical works must belong to a new category in fundamental ontology: initiated types. 9
What is an initiated type? Well, it’s a generic entity that is creatable, finely individuated,
and can include things like instrumentation essentially! From one point of view this can
look like not very subtle sleight of hand, and there continues to be much critical
discussion of the coherence of the idea of initiated types. This is the point of view that
sees musical ontology as just another instance of the problem of universals. 10 But from
another point of view, Levinson’s essay can be seen as the beginning of a concern with
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what exactly has priority when we do the ontology of art: it is implicit in the structure of
Levinson’s argument that the demands of the art one is attempting to understand trump
the demands of metaphysics. 11
In this essay I examine some recent efforts to make this methodological insight
explicit, and suggest that if it is taken seriously there is one ontological theory of musical
works, usually known as ‘fictionalism’, that deserves fuller consideration than it is
usually given. Though at the end of the essay I attempt to articulate this theory clearly,
and show why it should be taken more seriously, my main concern is not to defend the
theory, but to uncover its connections with the methodology that many ontologists of
music and the other arts appear to embrace. Similarly, I do not mount a full-scale defence
of this methodology; my concern is rather to investigate its implications. 12 The belief that
motivates this essay, and its moral, whether or not its arguments are convincing, is that
ontologists of music and the other arts need to think more carefully about their
methodology before offering various kinds of arguments in defence of their particular
views. 13

II. THE PRAGMATIC CONSTRAINT

In his recent book, Art as Performance, David Davies defends a theory according to
which works of art are not what we normally take them to be, for instance, bits of
stretched canvas with paint on them, string quartets, and so on. Rather, a work of art is
the extended action the artist engaged in in the production of what we pre-theoretically
take to be the work. This action is so intimately tied up with the ‘work-focus’ or ‘focus of
appreciation’ – the canvas, string quartet, or whatever – that we can perhaps think of that
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focus as part of the work if we accept Davies’s theory, but most of our interest in works
of art, as evidenced by our discourse about them, requires us to think of the work
primarily in terms of the artist’s ‘performance’ that resulted in the work. 14
Davies is more explicit about his methodology than any other art ontologist.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the theory he ends up defending, that methodology is one that
valorises ordinary artistic practice as the data to be explained by any ontology of art,
though Davies also argues that arriving at a general ontology of art will require a process
of achieving ‘reflective equilibrium’: the philosophical equivalent of finding a smooth
curve through the disparate data points that constitute our artistic practices. (Throughout I
use ‘artistic practice’ broadly, to include critical and appreciative practice.) Davies
summarizes this view in a methodological principle he calls ‘the pragmatic constraint’:
Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly ascribed to
what are termed ‘works’ in our reflective critical and appreciative practice; that
are individuated in the way such ‘works’ are or would be individuated, and that
have the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed to ‘works,’ in that
practice. 15
On the basis of the pragmatic constraint, Davies goes on to claim that arguments in the
ontology of art ought to (1) begin with what he calls an ‘epistemological premise’,
claiming that, on reflection, our artistic practice has us attributing properties of a certain
sort to what we call ‘works of art’, (2) continue with a methodological premise – the
pragmatic constraint that works must be such as to admit of such attributions – and (3)
end with an ontological conclusion that works of art must be (or cannot be) such-andsuch kinds of things (p. 23).
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How is it that with this explicit emphasis on ordinary artistic practice, Davies ends
up arguing for a view that is, on the face of it, quite unintuitive? 16 There is a clue in the
list of kinds of attributions Davies appeals to in his statement of the pragmatic constraint
(which he repeats when he comes to set out his argument schema), but it is easy to miss,
since the clue lies not in what Davies includes in the list, but rather in what he leaves out.
Specifically, Davies mentions (i) the actual properties we ascribe to artworks, including
aesthetic and artistic properties, (ii) the modal properties we ascribe to artworks, such as
that a string quartet might have had a different ending than it actually does, and (iii) the
ways we individuate works of art. Notably absent is any reference to our pre-theoretical
views about the ontology of artworks – the fundamental category to which they belong.
Davies defends this omission by claiming that
the intuitions that are strongest will be those that relate to practical aspects of
[artistic] practice…rather than intuitions about what works are, ontologically
speaking. I hope I speak for the reader in suggesting that, to the extent I have any
intuitions about the latter, they are grounded in my intuitions about the former.
(p. 22)
With this, Davies improves in two ways on the usual strategy of claiming that the
intuitions defended by one’s own theory are more strongly held by everyone than those
one’s theory refutes. First, though he speaks in such terms here, Davies does not appeal
simply to intuitions, but, as mentioned above, to claims suggested by rational reflection
on our artistic practice. Second, he gives a principled reason for rejecting one set of
claims over another, namely that the ontological claims are grounded in the practicalones.
It is this principle that I would like to call into question.
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The main objection I have to this principle is that we do have ontological
intuitions about artworks that are relatively independent of our other intuitions about art –
ontological intuitions that are rooted in our practice. This is evident in all the prima facie
counterexamples people raise when first confronted with, as we say, counterintuitive
ontological proposals such as Davies’s. We think of a painting, for instance, as being
spatially located, made of paint and canvas, capable of surviving beyond its artist’s life
and then being destroyed at some later time, and capable of being bought and sold in its
entirety. We think of a musical work as coming into existence with its composition, being
capable of being performed in its entirety an indefinite number of times, and being heard
in its entirety at any one of these performances. 17 That we have these beliefs about
artworks is evident not only when we ask people about them, or when we are doing art
ontology, but in just about any critical discourse, and much artistic practice. An artist
typically thinks of herself as selling the whole of one of her sculptures, I take it, and
sometimes wishes she had not parted with it so soon. A composer cares whether you have
heard a complete performance of his piece. Critics and public alike mourn the loss of a
painting in a fire.
Now, as pretty much any ontologist of art will agree, these intuitions are revisable
in the light of some philosophical theorizing, in part because most people admit we can’t
consistently hold on to all our intuitions. 18 But the point here is that our ontological
intuitions are part and parcel of our pre-theoretical beliefs about art, and must thus be
taken into account along with our other intuitions. To exclude precisely our ontological
intuitions from the data to be explained when we are engaged in the project of art
ontology seems perverse. To draw an analogy: in working on a definition of art, a theorist
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may have recourse to some claims about the value of art, but it would be peculiar if she
set aside our intuitions about the extension of the term ‘art’. She might suggest revising
our pre-theoretical intuitions about that extension, in the process of working out her
definition, but to exclude such intuitions from the start would be to ignore the central data
to be explained.

III. AN EVEN MORE PRAGMATIC CONSTRAINT

Guy Rohrbaugh has recently argued that we ought to do art ontology along the lines
suggested by Davies, but he acknowledges that part of the data to be explained by a
theory of art ontology is precisely our ontological intuitions. Thus we can see his
methodology as an extension of Davies’s ‘pragmatic constraint’. 19 In general, Rohrbaugh
argues that
[a] properly conceived ontology of art is one which provides a metaphysical
framework flexible enough to represent accurately a wide variety of phenomena
and to permit the expression of heterogeneous critical views, views which must be
evaluated in their own terms. Ontologies of art are beholden to our artistic
practices…and…critical debates are part of the practices to be captured.

(pp.

178-9)
In particular, he claims we have pre-theoretical intuitions that add up to a fairly robust
conception of the ontology of artworks: ‘Together, these three features [of modal
flexibility, temporal flexibility, and temporal existence] add up to a certain
conception…about the nature of works of art’ (p. 178).
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Whereas Davies must engage in damage control on the side of our ontological
intuitions, Rohrbaugh sees that he will face resistance from the other direction, that is,
from the direction of our ‘principles’ of philosophical, particularly ontological,
theorizing. For while Davies’s theory revolts against our ontological intuitions, the view
that Rohrbaugh defends is highly intuitive, but metaphysically unorthodox. Rohrbaugh’s
theory is that all artworks, but most notably multiply instantiable artworks, such as works
of music and photography, are ‘historical individuals’, that is, ‘ontologically dependent
items, whose creation, continued existence, and destruction are ultimately a matter of
how it goes with some other historical items’ (p. 191). In other words, just as a painting is
‘constituted by’ its canvas and oil paint, a photograph is ‘embodied in’ its negative and
prints. Constitution and embodiment are different relations, but Rohrbaugh argues that
they are similar in a fundamental way, which he captures in the idea that both
photographs and paintings are real. The sense of reality he has in mind is that these
things, like ordinary objects such as tables, rocks, and trees, but unlike such abstracta as
properties, have ‘what you might call “a life story”. They are all subject to change over
time, and…could have been somewhat different than they in fact are. Further…the
existence of all such items is rooted in the physical world’ (p. 199).
This widening of the scope of his conclusions is a pre-emptive strike on
Rohrbaugh’s part against objections that the features of artworks he describes can be
accounted for by a more conservative ontology, such as a traditional nominalist or realist
ontology of art. 20 Rohrbaugh claims that rejecting his new category of historical
individuals will have two unacceptable consequences. First, we will need to paraphrase
away not just some central claims about artworks, but also central claims about species,
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words, clubs and so on, all of which Rohrbaugh suggests are historical individuals.
Second, we will lose the account of the distinction between the real and the unreal that
Rohrbaugh argues we gain with his view.
One question we must ask if we are interested in the methodology of art ontology,
however, is whether such a pre-emptive strike should be necessary at all. Rohrbaugh
seems to be in the same position Jerrold Levinson was in once he had argued that musical
works must be creatable, finely individuable, and capable of possessing instrumental
properties essentially. Must one go on and provide a further metaphysical defence of the
category posited, beyond the ‘pragmatic’ one rooted in artistic practice? Rhetorically, of
course, the more defences the better. 21 If one can pre-empt objections from both the
artistic side and the metaphysical side, one is in a more secure position. But this muddies
the methodological waters. If purely metaphysical questions are beside the point, because
art-ontological disputes are to be decided on the basis of practice, then we ought to
acknowledge that fact. This would simplify our task in terms of which objections we
need to consider, but would be even more helpful in ruling whole methodologies out of
court.22

IV. DESCRIPTIVISM AND REVISIONISM

One useful way of approaching these issues is through Peter Strawson’s distinction
between descriptive metaphysics, which ‘is content to describe the actual structure of our
thought about the world’ and revisionary metaphysics, which ‘is concerned to produce a
better structure’, presumably one which describes more accurately the world as it is in
itself, independently of our thought about it.23 Strawson himself was concerned with the
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‘most fundamental’ concepts and categories, the ‘commonplaces of the least refined
thinking; and…yet the indispensible core of the conceptual equipment of the most
sophisticated human beings’, 24 but if the ontology of art is constrained by ordinary
artistic practice, then ontologists of art are also (or should be) engaged in a more
descriptive than revisionary project. (The methodologies of Davies and Rohrbaugh,
discussed above, are clearly descriptive in this sense.) Even if this is acknowledged,
however, there is a question of how descriptive to be.
Although Strawson mentions that it is unlikely any metaphysician has been
wholly descriptive or revisionary, 25 it seems to me that we should think of theorists not as
partly the one and partly the other, but as falling on a spectrum between two polar
extremes. 26 At the descriptive end of the spectrum is the particularist, who argues that
there is no such thing as the ontological nature of the artwork, the musical work, the
classical musical work for performance, or any kind of artwork. We must look at the
particular details in any given case, describing each work as it is, rather than fitting them
all, or any group of them, into a Procrustean ontological theory. 27 For the extreme
descriptivist, to describe the work as it is is simply to report how people think of it. One
reason no one tends to occupy this extreme position is widespread agreement that people
often think about things in a confused way. People who know nothing about a particular
artwork, or the tradition in which it is produced, often form an opinion about it more
quickly than those who are aware of its complexities. Since this situation gives rise to
contradictory claims about any particular artwork, unless we are to revise the laws of
logic, or embrace an ontological relativism about artworks, extreme descriptivism is an
untenable position. Most ontologists of art, then, first restrict the judgments taken into
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account to those made by people with an understanding of the tradition in which the work
was produced. Then, since even among such people there may be disagreements, most
ontologists appeal explicitly or implicitly to a rational reconstruction of, or reflective
equilibrium amongst the various expert judgments. Again, we have seen this above in the
methodologies of both Davies and Rohrbaugh. This is already to move away from the
descriptivist end of the spectrum.
As we move down the line, towards the revisionary end, we encounter ontologists
who give up more and more of our expert artistic judgements in the interests of a better
theory of the way artworks really are, independently of how we think about them. What
counts as a better theory, apart from accounting for the data of the artistic practice in
question? Of course there are the usual general theoretical ideals that are easy to list, but
difficult to explain or defend: unity, simplicity, perhaps even beauty or elegance. But
apart from these, many ontologists of art impose the further constraint on themselves that
the kinds of entities they appeal to must be metaphysically respectable. This
‘metaphysical constraint’, as we might call it, is sometimes appealed to very explicitly,
and made to shoulder much of the burden of defending an art-ontological theory, while in
other cases it is appealed to implicitly, and considered just one constraint among many.
We have already seen a couple of examples of the latter approach in the work of
Levinson and Rohrbaugh. In addition to their arguments for a new ontological category
on the basis of artistic practice, each provides a defence of that category in broad
metaphysical terms, appealing to entities other than artworks. Thus they implicitly
endorse the idea that one’s proposed category must be not only artistically, but also
metaphysically, respectable.
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A clear example of the former approach – explicitly appealing to the need for
metaphysical respectability – is Julian Dodd’s recent defence of a ‘simple’ type/token
musical ontology, according to which musical works are more or less Platonic universals
– eternal, unchanging, modally inflexible, unstructured types of sound event.28 One of the
mainstays of Dodd’s defence of this position is the claim that, in contrast to other
metaphysical entities, types, and the relation that tokens bear to them, are well
understood, holding an unimpeachable place in any general ontology. For instance, at the
beginning of his book, Dodd claims that immediately upon noting that musical works are
repeatable, we are
invited to treat musical works as types because…we thereby provide a familiar
and plausible explanation of the nature of the relation holding between a work and
its occurrences. …Rather than being a queer relation of embodiment, it turns out
to be just one more example of the familiar relation that holds, for instance,
between the word ‘table’ and its token inscriptions and utterances. 29
Dodd goes on throughout the book to defend his theory in large part on the basis of the
metaphysical respectability of types: first, as opposed to the metaphysical obscurity of the
entities posited by rival theories and, second, despite the plethora of unintuitive
consequences that follow from his own theory.
Though this kind of strategy is familiar, and apparently accepted by most people
engaged in these debates, it should give us serious pause. For if a ‘pragmatic’,
descriptivist approach to the ontology of art is the correct one, then it is not clear what
force such appeals to general metaphysical claims or theories should have. If in proposing
a theory of the ontology of art we are really offering a description of the ‘structure of our
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thought’ about artworks, then the existence and nature of such philosophical arcana as
types, properties, and so on, look like they might be beside the point, just as the laws of
physics that govern the structural integrity of tables and chairs are irrelevant to whether
something counts as a table or a chair.
A defender of the metaphysical constraint might respond as follows. He could
point out that the kinds of ‘metaphysical’ debate I am suggesting we might do without are
in fact correctly described as descriptivist. The point of descriptivism, it might be said, is
to change not the way we go about metaphysics, but how we conceive of what we are
doing. Instead of having the rather surprising goal of figuring out from our armchairs
how the world is independently of our thought about it, we should acknowledge that we
are trying to figure out how we ultimately conceive of the world. So it is a mistake to
draw an analogy between musical works and fundamental ontology, on the one hand, and
furniture and physics on the other. Physics is revisionary – it cares about how things
really are, not about how we think about them – but fundamental metaphysics may well
be as descriptive as musical ontology. Thus our ontological theories of music should
cohere with our fundamental ontological theories – we can radically revise our intuitions
about the ontological nature of musical works while being thoroughgoing descriptivists.
While I am sympathetic to the premises of this argument, I reject the conclusion.
The fact, if it is one, that fundamental metaphysics is descriptive does not directly imply
that our ‘higher-order’ ontologies must mesh with our fundamental ontology. 30 In part
this is because (pace David Davies) those involved in the arts think about the nature of
artworks quite a lot, and often quite explicitly. By contrast, few people other than
metaphysicians think about the nature of objects and their properties, say. Thus, there is
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no reason to expect that the way we think about musical works will mesh with, for
instance, the way we think about electrons having particular spins. Furthermore, though
musical works must have some fundamental nature, if they exist at all, it does not follow
that they will be metaphysically fundamental in the same sense as substances or tropes
might be. Musical works get made in complex social situations – they are cultural
artefacts. Part of what this means is that their nature and properties depend not only on
individual minds but on complex interactions between many different minds, and thus
they will be at least as high up the ontological ladder as minds. 31 It is surely something
like this thought that is behind the idea that musical ontology is ineliminably descriptive,
because if this is correct, then how musical works are depends upon how people think
about them.
An alternative response would be to defend revisionism about general
metaphysics. Consideration of such a defence is beyond the scope of this essay,
fortunately for me. But I hope it is clear that the replies given to the previous response are
equally applicable here. The fact, if it is one, that fundamental metaphysics is revisionary
does not directly imply that musical ontology is revisionary. Moreover, the
considerations given above about the dependence of musical works on complex social
practices give us reason to suspect that musical ontology is descriptive whether or not
fundamental metaphysics is.
Finally, one might explicitly defend revisionism about musical ontology.
Considering such a defence is also beyond the scope of this essay. I will just point out
here that a return to revisionism would be a return to the bad old Goodman days – the
days when artistic practice played no more role in our art-ontological theories than

16

delimiting a set of phenomena to be investigated. If the ontology of art has changed for
the better since those days, in becoming more answerable to artistic practice, then
whatever reasons we have for approving of those changes will be reasons to reject artontological revisionism.
In sum, if art ontology is a truly descriptivist field, then ontological theories of
other domains, such as fundamental metaphysics, are beside the point. As mentioned
above, we may be justified in thinking that our ontological theories of art (as with our
theories of everything else) must obey the laws of logic, but if they are truly descriptive
they are not beholden to anything else, apart from our artistic practice, in ways already
discussed. If the best rational reconstruction of the ontological conception of artworks
implicit in artistic practice is that they are X, Y, and Z, then artworks are in fact the kind
of thing that is X, Y, and Z.

V. DESCRIPTIVISM AND FICTIONALISM

It would be nice to be able to explain how it is that our musical practices determine the
fundamental ontological nature of musical works. With such a theory in hand, we could
truly embrace descriptivism about musical ontology and eschew the more technical,
apparently revisionist discussions of musical ontology so prevalent in the literature.
One might think that Amie Thomasson’s recent work on the reference of art-kind
terms provides a way of integrating a descriptivist approach to art ontology with a
concern for fundamental metaphysics. 32 In short, Thomasson argues that if we refer with
art-kind terms at all, it is to things with the basic ontological properties that we conceive
those kinds as possessing. A problem arises if there are no such things, though. In that
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case, Thomasson claims that we refer to the closest ontological competitor. However, if
we fail to refer to what we thought we referred to with some art-kind term, it is not clear
that we must be referring instead to the closest competitor to the ontological conception
implicit in our practice; we might simply fail to refer. Furthermore, if we do refer to some
closest competitor, it seems likely that in our attempts to find that competitor we will be
led away from descriptivism to the kind of revisionism we would like to avoid. 33
Another place it is tempting to look for such an explanation is the literature on
‘social construction’. For there we find discussions of how it is that by merely acting in
certain ways, we bring it about that certain things are (correctly) classified in certain
ways. Unfortunately, for our purposes, most of this work is concerned not with the
construction of things, but with the construction of concepts or categories of things, or, at
best, the attribution of new properties to pre-existing things. 34 Since the major issue in
fundamental musical ontology is the nature of the things themselves – musical works –
this avenue is not as promising as it might at first appear.
There is another approach which I believe merits more serious consideration than
it is usually afforded. This view is usually labelled ‘fictionalism’, but in the interests of
approaching it with fresh eyes, I will introduce it through a similar theory about language
recently defended by Georges Rey. Rey’s central claim is that ‘standard linguistic
entities’ (SLEs), such as phonemes, words, and sentences, are ‘intentional inexistents’. 35
What he means by this is that (a) there are no such things, either outside the mind in the
concrete or abstract realms, or inside the mind, but that (b) there is a quite robust shared
system of representations of such things. Part of the motivation for the view is that the
most successful linguistic theories refer to such things as sentences with complex
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grammatical structure, yet at the same time linguistics provides evidence that there are no
token sentences with such structure.36 The ultimate explanation of how we communicate
by means of sentences when there don’t seem to be any, strictly speaking, is that we are
engaged in
a kind of folie à deux (or à n, for the n speakers of a common language): the
speaker has the illusion of producing an SLE that the hearer has the illusion of
hearing, with however the happy result that the hearer is usually able to determine
precisely what the speaker intended to utter. …[The] existence [of SLEs] is
completely inessential to the success of normal communication and to the needs
of linguistic theory. 37
It is worth considering whether musical works may be such ‘intentional
inexistents’. We discover the kinds of properties musical works must have (creatability,
and so on) by investigating musical practice, just as we discover what properties
sentences must have by investigating linguistic practice. While the claim that there are no
musical works with these properties is not as well-established as the parallel linguistic
claim, the ongoing and seemingly intractable disputes about the fundamental
metaphysical nature of musical works seems akin to the linguists’ evidence that there are
no sentences with the requisite structure. 38 More loosely, the ways musical ideas are
disseminated through works is analogous to the way ideas are disseminated through
language: They are set down in writing, and communicated through ‘utterances’
(performances), none of which need match the structure of the work perfectly. Certainly
there is a robust system of representing works in our compositional, performative, and

19

critical musical practices. In short, it would make no difference if there were no musical
works, strictly speaking, as long as we all continued to behave as if there were.
It might seem puzzling at first that pursuing descriptivism could result in such an
unintuitive theory. We seem to be in a similar dialectical position to that of David Davies,
according to the account I gave above. But this is not so. If we truly embrace
descriptivism, we embrace the idea that when we do musical ontology, what we describe
is our conceptions of musical works, rather than the things themselves. There is a certain
irony in the idea that if we take descriptivism, and thus our conceptions of musical works,
seriously, we should conclude that those works have no existence beyond our
conceptions of them. But this irony should be softened by the security our conceptions of
musical works gain against revisionist attacks.
Given the descriptivist retreat to explication of our concepts of musical works,
should we be agnostic or quietist about their existence, rather asserting their inexistence?
To answer this question in full would require at least another essay, but there is one basic
reason, analogous to that Rey has for asserting the inexistence of SLEs, to prefer
‘atheism’ about musical works to agnosticism. In essence it is an appeal to Occam’s
razor. If we are not required to posit the existence of musical works as we conceive them
in order to account for the data our ontological theory must explain, then we should not. 39
Having briefly set out this variety of fictionalism about musical works, let me
distinguish it from some views with which it might be confused. First, this view should
be clearly distinguished from eliminativism. Eliminativists about Xs argue that we ought
to stop talking about Xs, and start talking about Ys, which were really what we were
talking about all along, albeit confusedly. 40 Rey does not suggest this for linguistic
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entities, nor does the fictionalist for musical works. Part of the reason for this is that, on
the view proposed, while there aren’t really any Xs, there aren’t any Ys, either. If there
aren’t any musical works, we are getting along fine without them, and there is no reason
to change this happy state of affairs.
Second, fictionalism should be distinguished from nominalism, both narrowly and
broadly construed. In the narrow sense, nominalist proposals about musical ontology are
close to eliminativist, or at least reductionist, proposals. The nominalist seeks to identify
works with things, such as scores and performances, or sets thereof, that are more
familiar to us than what is posited by other theories, such as types or historical
individuals. Again, we are getting along fine talking about musical works in addition to
performances, scores, and so on, not to mention the problems that arise when we try to
reduce work-talk to performance-talk, and so on. In the broad sense, nominalists are those
who attempt to do away with all abstract objects. This is not the place to go into that
dispute, but I should at least note that the arguments for the intentional inexistence of
linguistic entities and musical works do not warrant such a broad conclusion. It is not at
all clear that the arguments for the inexistence of phonemes or musical works could be
extended to numbers or properties. 41
Third, the view should be distinguished from idealism. The claim is not that
musical works are mental entities, any more than the claim that there are no witches is the
claim that witches are our thoughts about witches. What is ‘ideal’ (i.e., mental or
psychological) according to the proposal is only our thoughts about musical works. But
this doesn’t distinguish musical works from anything else. The distinctive claim is that
there are no musical works, ideal or otherwise, but that we have thoughts ‘about them’
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nonetheless. This kind of talk always has an air of paradox about it, but there is nothing
more problematic here than our usual ‘references to’ the Greek gods, witches, and so
on. 42 Of course, one might object that such reference is problematic enough. All I can do
here is suggest that if we can talk about witches without there being such things – real,
abstract, ideal, or otherwise – we can do the same for musical works. We ought not to
talk seriously about witches because of the pernicious social results of such talk. But
though similar arguments about musical works may be possible, our ongoing musical
practices are presumably rather valuable, and thus there is no need to change those
practices to bring them into accord with the inexistence of musical works (whatever that
would entail!).
Need or no, you might wonder if musical practice could remain unchanged, at
least for those who have embraced the theory. For surely if you don’t believe there are
any musical works, you can’t seriously intend to play one, for instance. The fictionalist
can first respond that it will be very difficult even for himself to take this theory seriously
in practice, so thoroughly enmeshed are we in our conceptual scheme about music.
(Think of the analogous difficulty of expressing explicitly the fictional status of
characters and events in a film under discussion.) But, second, even if one could keep the
theory at the forefront of one’s mind, all one would have to do would be to explicitly
intend to produce a sound event (or whatever) that would be taken by a knowledgeable
listener to be a performance of a particular work. Similarly for the philosopher of
language who can’t stop thinking about the intentional inexistence of SLEs. She can still
communicate with other people, even though she knows that she is not really producing
token sentences with the structure her linguistic theory ‘requires’ of them.
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Finally, if fictionalism is embraced, what are the consequences for the study of
musical ontology? To ask this is perhaps to come full circle. We arrived at fictionalism
by taking the path of descriptivism seriously. Thus it is not surprising if fictionalism leads
us to be descriptivists. Rather than putting the point in this circular fashion, though, it is
more accurate to see descriptivism and fictionalism as going hand in hand. If we are
descriptivists, it seems to me that much musical ontology can go on as before. Consider
higher-level musical ontology. The question, for example, of whether works of rock
music are songs for a kind of performance or replete recordings for playback is
independent of the fundamental metaphysical nature of repeatable sonic entities (be they
songs or recordings). This question has largely, and rightly, been addressed by examining
our musical practice – that is, descriptively. It is no more reasonable to object to this
debate on fictionalist grounds that there are no musical works than it is to object to a
debate about Hamlet’s motivations on the grounds that there is no such person.
Fundamental musical ontology is a little more problematic, since there is a little
more cognitive dissonance in making claims about the fundamental nature of musical
works while maintaining there are no such things. But, again, as long as we keep the
tenets of descriptivism and fictionalism clearly in mind, there is in fact no incoherence
here. To say that musical works are repeatable, and thus types or sound structures, is
shorthand for saying that we conceive of musical works as repeatable, and thus as types or
sound structures. There is still plenty of room for debate over exactly how we conceive of
musical works. Is instrumentation essential to them? Are they timeless entities or tethered
to their contexts of creation? And so on. All of these questions can be asked about how
we conceive of musical works while maintaining that, strictly speaking, there are no such
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things. One methodological advance we can make as descriptivist fictionalists is to rule
out certain manoeuvres, such as objecting to an ontological proposal on the grounds that,
although it is an accurate reflection of the conception of musical works implicit in our
practice, it is metaphysically indefensible.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Many musical (and other art) ontologists seem to embrace what I have called a
descriptivist methodology. I have argued that if we take descriptivism seriously, we
should also take seriously the theory that there may be no such things as musical works,
independent of our conceptions of them. Though this theory is counterintuitive, it has the
advantage of allowing us to embrace descriptivism wholeheartedly, and to reject certain
kinds of arguments about musical ontology, such as those appealing to the ‘metaphysical
constraint’ that such theories must be independently metaphysical defensible. Even if
these conclusions are thought incorrect, I hope to have shown that art ontologists would
do well to examine their methods more closely. 43
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